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THE MIDDLE EAST
Gholam Khiabany
In mapping the scholarship and recent interest in the Arab media scene, Helga Tawil-Souri suggests
that pan-Arab satellite television is exploding in a number of ways: in quantity, in political terms,
as well as an area of academic inquiry.1 The explosion of Arab media into the scene was heralded
as the clearest indication of forces of globalization, renewed faith in the role of media in social
change, and prospect of democratization. Yet the rapid process of internationalization from the
very start contained a number of significant paradoxes and had the potential to unravel. The financial
crash of 2008, followed by the Arab revolts of 2011 and the subsequent political earthquakes 
in the region, have indeed led to even further media concentration, especially in the hands of
Gulf capital.
The explosion of pan-Arab satellite television channels, however, did not happen in a vacuum.
Broadly speaking, the concerns for Middle Eastern media are similar to those identified by Herman
and McChesney as they pertain to global media in general: the dramatic restructuring of national
media and the concentration of media power in the hands of a few players.2 In the past three
decades, many states in the Middle East have introduced economic reforms and policies that 
have transformed and remolded the region. Such programs, negotiated with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, are usually labeled as economic liberalization. However,
structural adjustment and transformation programs cannot be simply reduced to “economic
liberalization,” and the level and scope of economic transformation and changes have been complex.
These processes are loaded with contradictions. Media systems in general, and the television industry
in particular provide one important and visible example of the attempt to subordinate national
economies to the powers of international and domestic capital. As others have suggested,3 some
reforms have not only paved the way for the emergence of new business and social avenues, but
have also created new sources of social, political, and cultural authorities that rival and subvert
established authorities to certain degrees. The newly established and yet regionally and
internationally recognized media “brands” in the Middle East have indeed been a major topic of
international communications in recent years.
To that end, however, we cannot begin to discuss the “media giants” of the region without
highlighting a few crucial points. First, it is important to remember that while the Arab World
is a historical, geographic, and cultural reality, the Middle East is a geographically leaky term.4
More precisely, the term is a construct, a strategic concept invented by the British Empire. Two
major issues tie the region to the “international community,” the United States of America in
particular: oil/gas resources and Israel.
1111
2
3
4
5111
6
7
8
9
1011
1
2
3111
4
5
6
7
8111
9
20111
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
30111
1
2
3
4
35
6
7
8
9
40111
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9111
6805 GLOBAL MEDIA GIANTS A2_7 x 10  12/04/2016  11:09  Page 273
1ST PROOFS: NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION
Second, as Sreberny has argued, the region is “a highly differentiated region, along many different
kinds of social variables.”5 Even the Arab World, in which there is a strong and real feeling of
collective national identity, is highly differentiated and can be divided into three groups: the oil
states (the rentier states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Libya,
Iraq, and Algeria), the strategic states (Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, and
Morocco), and the peripheral states, which are actually peripheries within the periphery (Sudan,
Mauritania, Western Sahara, Somalia, Djibouti, and Comoros islands). The periphery states do
not play a significant political role in in the region and it is no accident that they remained “immune”
from the revolutionary fervor of the “Arab Spring” in 2011. To be sure, even these groupings
can be a little bit misleading, for in each there are variations and diversities that cannot be ignored.
For example, Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab World where more than 22% of
the region’s people live. Compare this to Lebanon, another country in the “strategic states” group
with only 1% share of the region’s population. Egypt also has been in the grip of brutal
dictatorship, in contrast to Lebanon where the political structure is organized along sectarian divides.
These two countries, however, have played a significant political and cultural role in the region.
Nevertheless, both countries have been significant hubs for media and cultural productions despite
their differences. Above all, it is no exaggeration to suggest that the countries in the “strategic
states” group remain the weakest link in a region that is considered the weakest link in the world
system. This is where the heart of Arab revolts beat strongest.
Third, as will be discussed, the “media giants” in the region are explicitly linked to the growth
of Gulf capital. Of particular importance has been the emergence and “formation of large capital-
groups that dominate the respective economies of the new regional block.”6 The members of the
small Arab states gathered under the umbrella of Gulf Corporation Council (GCC), with a total
population of 50 million (of which almost half are migrant workers), have a combined economic
output of over $1.3 trillion. It is important to remember that gross per capita domestic product
of some of these GCC countries is much higher than the average of member countries of OECD.
Gulf capital is central to the rise, development, and expansion of media in the region and globally.
The role of Saudi Arabia (the biggest country in the Gulf region and with a higher population
than all other Gulf States combined together) is very central indeed. It is not just the size of audiences
in the country that makes Saudi Arabia the major player in the Gulf but also the size of its capital.
It is no accident that of the media conglomerates in the region, Aljazeera is the only company
that is not controlled by Saudi’s interests.7
Fourth, in all cases the development, expansion, and consolidation of media companies have
been an integral part of development of state capacity in the region. The economic and political
links of media companies to the ruling elites, therefore, are not simply a matter of certain ties to
the state or particular lobbying efforts. Trends that have usually been reduced to “economic
liberalization,” including within the media industry, are entirely facilitated, maintained, and
controlled by the state. Mohamed Zayani has aptly pointed out that in the “Arab world, the media
in general and satellite channels in particular, operate under a patron who is either the government
or some rich owner who in many cases is associated, in one way or another, with the ruling elite
or the government.”8 The explicit link between media ownership and politics is of course not
unique to the region. For example, Silvio Berlusconi’s media empire is a notable case of strong
ties between the media and the state in Italy. In the Gulf region, however, one has to use the
term “privatization” or “private capital” with extreme caution. The personal ties and patronage
have remained key factors in the development and operation of media companies. As Sami Zubaida
has pointed out in his discussion of historical forms of the public sphere in the region, “ ‘Print
capitalism’ for instance was rarely capitalist (is it even now?), but dependent on patronage and
subvention. And it never consisted just of private persons debating public issues, but always had
ties to state, dynastic and colonial interests.”9 As will be shown throughout this chapter, this is
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still the case and even more so in Gulf-funded media companies. Capitalist development in the
region, including the development of media, is politically determined in a number of ways.
Fifth, the broader internationalization of capital in the region and emergence of pan-Arab satellite
channels have brought with them not the decline of nation-state as advocated by globalization
theories, but the formation of a state with a contradictory role. The product of such existing forces
is the formation of a strong state, which is torn, to use David Harvey’s terms, between the “logic
of capital” and the “logic of territory.”10 For example, Saudi Arabia invested the most in satellite
channels and, yet, satellites are officially banned in that country.
Finally, we need to use the label of “giants” for Middle Eastern media companies carefully and
relatively. The media corporations that are discussed in this chapter are without a doubt the largest
in the region and they are backed by the immensely powerful capital of Gulf States, especially
Saudi Arabia. However, they pale in comparison with the likes of other global media giants, like
Disney, Apple, Google, or others.
Middle Eastern Giants in Context
Contrary to exceptionalist theories, which see the Middle East as a sealed space that can be explained
either purely in terms of oil revenue or its “culture” (Islam), the region has developed not in
isolation from but within the development of global capitalism. Global capitalism is not “external”
to the region. As Hanieh points out in his detailed discussion of capitalism and class relations in
the Gulf region, “the global economy is part of the actual essence of the Gulf itself—the
development of the global ‘appears’ through the development of the Gulf.”11 The development
of media in the region is no exception. Indeed, what has been hailed invariably as the emergence
of “contraflow”12 Arab public sphere,13 etc. has to be seen as part of the much wider development
and circulation of capital and labor in the region. The cross-border and transnational investments
and productions in the region go beyond the production of tangible commodities: they encompass
significant investment and activity in media and communications. The media field has emerged
and become a focal point for the accumulation of capital and power. The “media giants” that are
discussed below demonstrate this reality. In this sense, Naomi Sakr is absolutely right in insisting
that the development of media in the Middle East, like all discussion of transnational media, should
be seen in a much wider global context.14
Since the 1990s the number of media channels has increased rapidly. This is particularly the
case for television. There were 18 channels in 1993, most of which were state-owned and operated.
The first wave of expansion in that decade that took advantage of technological development that
was mostly targeted at the richest audiences. By 2005 the number had increased to 150, and by
2010 the numbers of channels were estimated at 450. While the numbers have increased rapidly,
the field as a whole has been dominated by Saudi Arabia. Since the 2000s, four conglomerates
have dominated satellite TV as well as other media: (1) the Middle East Broadcasting Corporation
(MBC), owned and controlled by Sheikh Walid al-Ibrahim, who is the brother-in-law of Saudi
Arabia’s late King Fahd; (2) Arab Radio and Television (ART), owned by Saudi Arabia’s Dallah
Al Baraka Group; (3) LBC-Rotana, owned and controlled by Saudi Arabia’s Kingdom Holding
Group; and (4) Orbit Showtime Network, which was established after the merger of Orbit (owned
by Saudi Arabia’s Mawarid Group) and Showtime Arabia (a joint venture between Kuwait’s KIPCO
and North American giant CBS). The level of concentration becomes even more obvious if we
consider the fact that the Arab World, in general, and the Gulf countries, in particular, is considered
as a single market because of shared language. Saudi Arabia’s influence is also confirmed by the
fact that Arab television industries are particularly keen to cater to the kingdom’s television
audiences.15 Two Saudi conglomerates, MBC and LBC-Rotana control one-third of the free-to-
air television in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE. The number of pay-TV channels is estimated
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close to 150, and audiences of these channels are divided between ART and Orbit Showtime
Network.16 The sector as a whole has been international from the early days, with significant number
of mergers and acquisition, cross-media and cross-border ownership, joint ventures with regional
and international capital, as well as significant levels of activities across a number of industries.
Middle East Broadcasting Corporation
It is no accident that the emergence of the Middle Eastern “media giants” can be traced back to
the early 1990s when a number of factors began to remold the region, including the intervention
in Iraq and increased pressure for economic liberalization. The trendsetter in the media field was
the Middle East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) Group. In approximately three decades, MBC
has been transformed into a $2.9 billion business empire. MBC began its operation from London
in September 1991, as the first privately owned Arab network offering non-stop free-to-air television
programs. This project was the first promising to reach all Arab citizens inside and outside the
region, including literate and illiterate men and women, who were dispersed and scattered in
different countries. Two well-connected Saudi capitalists, Sheikh Saleh Kamel and Sheikh Walid
al-Ibrahim, funded the creation of MBC. MBC’s desire and intent for international investment
and expansion was made clear when it purchased United Press International (UPI), one of the
four major international news agencies, for $3.95 million less than a year after the start of operations.
After the acquisition, the company immediately injected $12 million to upgrade UPI services.17
It has been suggested18 that the owners had different visions for MBC, which is indicated by
the fact that the partnership ended in 1993 and Walid al-Ibrahim took complete control of the
company. Walid al-Ibrahim’s royal connections and deep pockets assured the success of MBC’s
operation, as well as its expansion. MBC’s start-up capital was $300 million and its annual running
costs around $60 million. Through the same royal connection, MBC was not only able to rent
a powerful transponder in which Saudi Arabia was a majority shareholder (Arabsat satellite), but
it also obtained a license to launch MBC-FM as the only commercial terrestrial radio in 1994. It
also secured a contract to broadcast a number of channels to Saudi homes via a cable network.
MBC’s budget and funding shrank as a result of sharp decline in Saudi’s oil income in the late
1990s. Cost-cutting measures soon followed. UPI was sold to the Unification Church of Sun
Myung Moon (the owner of the Washington Times) in 2000, and in 2001 the company moved
its headquarters from London to the newly inaugurated Dubai Media City, an economic free
zone created primarily for media productions. Sheikh Walid al-Ibrahim justified the move to Dubai
by saying that “they had done a pretty good job in convincing us to move.”19 The reason for
relocation was apparently “ ‘freedom of speech’ which was the ‘only thing that made us to go to
London in the first place.’”20
Undoubtedly the restrictions in Saudi Arabia are one factor that has prevented the company
being based within the country where it is funded. However, the major disadvantage is that Dubai
Media City insists on restrictions over content. As Sakr has suggested, the economic benefits of
operating in Dubai Media City are immense. Companies operating in this media-focused economic
free zone “were offered 100% tax exemption for 50 years and allowed 100% foreign ownership.
But they were not allowed to operate uncensored.”21 Sakr also suggests that MBC was offered
additional incentives. The move from London to Dubai indeed helped MBC to cut its overall
costs by 30%.22 MBC settled in its new location and, with oil prices picking up again, began
transforming itself into a multi-channel network.
MBC is part of the Arab Group International (AGI) Holding Company, and the holding
company already had a privileged position in Saudi Arabia. In 2003 it began adding to its portfolio
of channels. MBC2 was launched in that year and made available by satellite in the region and
terrestrially in Bahrain. Unlike MBC, which was a general channel and presented itself as “family
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viewing,” the additional channel tried to tap into a young audience market by acquiring many
top American and British entertainment programs, as well as controversial formats such as Big
Brother (al-Ra’is), which proved a costly experiment. As Naomi Sakr23 has suggested, the success
of reality TV hits on other channels convinced MBC to be more daring. However while the
“love interest” between the participants of the show was a big factor in attracting audiences in
other countries, in the Arab World it was controversial. The public protests in Manama, Bahrain
and the heated debate in parliament and newspapers forced MBC to suspend the show after just
one week in 2004. Controversies over reality TV are not unique to the region. For Kraidy, however,
Arab reality TV is intensely controversial “because it violates boundaries of identity and authenticity
at a time when these boundaries have been hardened by widespread violence in the Middle East
and various controversies over Islam. For some opponents, al-Ra’is and Star Academy were links
in a chain of horrors—Abu Ghrayb, Guantanamo, the infamous Danish cartoons, and others baffling
Arabs and Muslims.”24 The tension between the logic of the market, the expectation of various
states in the Gulf, and competing ideological agenda were plainly obvious in this case.
In 2004, the company launched MBC3 as a children’s channel and turned MBC2 into a movie
channel. Sitcoms and other format programs were moved to MBC4. MBC entertained the plan
for a news channel in the 1990s but the plan, despite—or perhaps because of—the Aljazeera success
story, was shelved in 1998. The company later revived the idea when it launched Al-Arabiya in
a joint venture with Lebanese and Kuwaiti investors ahead of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Al-Arabiya came under the total control of MBC in 2006. In a further move to expand its activities,
MBC operates the television news agency Middle East News (MEN). MEN not only shares facilities
with Al-Arabiya, it also provides technical and logistical support as well as facilities for other clients,
including TV stations in Bahrain, Oman, and Al-Ekhbariya, which is a news channel directly owned
and controlled by the Saudi state.25 In 2007 the company launched MBC Action and the music
channel Wanasah, and one year later it added MBC Persia, MBC Max, and MBC Plus to its
portfolio, followed by the launch of MBC Drama in 2010. MBC’s radio channels include MBC-
FM, Panorama, HI FM, and Hala FM, all launched between 1994 and 2007. MBC’s expansion
has also seen the company making gains in its online presence through Al-Arabyia.net, MBC.net,
Shahad Online, Jawal MBC, and MoBC. Such expansion, however, comes at a cost, and a huge
one for that matter. This, of course, follows the logic of media capital across the globe, as many
don’t really seem to be economically viable when reliant on commercial revenue streams. In 2011,
Ali Jaber, the MBC Group TV director, announced that Arab satellite channels are notoriously
stricken with financial losses, running at an annual aggregate loss of $5.5 billion. The running
costs are high and are estimated at around $6.5 billion, while advertising revenue is estimated to
be $1 billion.26
Arab Radio and Television
Arab Radio and Television is part of the Dallah Al Baraka Group, which is controlled by Saleh
Abdullah Kamel. The Dallah Al Baraka Group is a conglomerate with significant interests in banking,
construction, and tourism. Saleh Kamel is one of the richest and well-connected capitalists in the
region. In 2015, Forbes listed him as the 17th richest Arab with a net worth of $2.8 billion.27
Kamel was born in Taif, Saudi Arabia, grew up in Mecca, and attended Riyadh University. Earlier
in his life he worked at the kingdom’s Ministry of Finance, but he left public office to start the
Dallah Works and Maintenance Company in 1969 in Riyadh. Despite not being born into the
royal family, he is well connected and has remained loyal to the Saudi ruling elite. As Enhab
Galal28 has pointed out, his family was responsible for guiding pilgrims on hajj in Mecca and “his
father was employed under the patronage of Prince Faisal bin Abdel-Aziz,” who later became the
king of Saudi Arabia in 1964 and ruled the country till his death in 1975.
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The Dallah Works and Maintenance Company became the Dallah Avco Trans Arabia Company
in 1975 and expanded its activities from construction to the provision of food, maintenance, and
operation services at military bases and hospitals. The company also imports large volumes of
consumer products, such as electrical appliances and household technologies. Its major subsidiaries
include the Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Company, Al-Samaha Trade Holding Company, 
Al-Jazira Transport Company, and Dallah Telecom Company. The various activities of the
conglomerate are organized through these subsidiaries. The company is also a major shareholder
in the Albaraka Banking Group registered in Manama, Bahrain. The company is listed on both
the Bahrain Stock Market and NASDAQ Dubai. It introduces itself as “a leading international
Islamic banking group providing its unique services in countries with a population totaling around
one billion.”29 The group operates “strictly in accordance with the principles of the Islamic
Shari’a”30, and in addition to the board of directors it also has a Shari’a supervisory board. The
total assets of the group at the end of 2011 were more than $17 billion, and its principle shareholders
are Shaikh Saleh Abdullah Kamel (30.11%), Dallah Al Baraka Holding Company EC (24.64%),
Altawfeek Company for Investment Funds (20.65%), and Abdulla AbdulAziz Al Rajihi (6.81%).
It has 560 branches in Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Bahrain, Pakistan, South
Africa, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, as well as in Indonesia and Libya. The Dallah
group also owns 19% of Al-Jazira bank, which is ranked 34 in the Arab World. In total, Saleh
Kamel is active as a shareholder and owner of 340 companies that operate in 42 countries.31
The Dallah Al Baraka Group also has interests in media and communication. Dallah Telecom,
thanks to the company’s contacts with the Saudi ruling elite, has won major contracts providing
CCTV, access control, fire alarm, and anti-intrusion for military facilities, hospital, universities,
and private companies in Saudi Arabia. The group’s substantial resources and its rights to major
sporting events also allowed it to control and manage the mobile broadcasting rights of large sporting
events like the FIFA World Cup, Golf Cup, and Asian Cup. The main media activities of the
company are managed and operated through the Arab Radio and Television Company (ART),
which was launched in 1993 as a pay-TV subsidiary of the Arab Media Corporation. Saleh Kamel
set up Arab Media Corporation in 1977 as one of the early production companies specializing in
radio, film, and television. It was, however, through his involvement with MBC that Kamel’s
interests in media expanded significantly. In 1993 he sold his share (37.5) to his business partner
at MBC and immediately set up his own satellite channel, ART.32 Saleh Kamel’s Dallah Al Baraka
Group controls 70% of ART, and the remaining 30% is owned by another Saudi Prince, Alwaleed
bin Talal, who controls a vast range of media in the region, including LBC-Rotana. Bin Talal
paid $240 million for 30% of ART in 1993.
Saleh Kamel had a different vision from Sheikh Walid al-Ibrahim, his partner at MBC, and it
was no accident that he set up his own satellite operation as a pay-TV venture. ART had no
plans to compete with MBC. For Saleh Kemel, a massive initial investment of $300 million in
this project was not simply a matter of making profits. In fact, as Sakr has argued, both owners
of ART seemed happy and willing to subsidize ART from profits of their other businesses since
there was no evidence to suggest that the company had made any money from 1994 to 1999.
The annual loss of ART was estimated at $168 million per year. ART advertising revenue in
1998 was less than $26.5 million, which was a miserly return since in the same year the two
shareholders had injected additional $250 million to cover the extra cost of adding four new
channels.33
ART was based in Rome and began broadcasting initially from Fucino and later on from
Avezzano. In 2002, and after eight years of operation from Italy, ART relocated to the newly
inaugurated media city, Jordan Media City. This new location is next to the Jordan Radio and
Television building. During the same period, many companies, including MBC and Orbit, began
to move their base from Europe to the region. Saleh Kamel apparently believed that there was a
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campaign in the West to undermine Arab culture and tradition as a reason for the move.34
Undoubtedly there were (and still are) significant anti-Arab and anti-Muslims sentiments, including
outright racism and campaigns in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
but the targets of such sentiments were rarely Arab capitalists or ruling elites. But Kamel’s claims
conceal the real reasons that many companies relocated to the region, which were the favorable
tax arrangements and union laws.35 In fact, many of the big media conglomerates were significant
investors in newly established media cities in the region. Jordan Media City, to which ART
relocated, is owned by Saleh’s Dallah Media Production Company. The site had been there since
the 1970s, but the project came to realization after Jordan’s free zone law made regulatory changes.
In 2004, a spokesman for Jordan Media City announced that ART was expected to reduce its
overall operation costs by 60%.36
ART’s initial catalogue of channels consisted of one general channel, one completely dedicated
to sport, one for film, and one broadcasting children programs. This was a period of relentless
privatization of media for a number of countries in the region, and Saudi investors or those with
connections to Saudi companies and the royal family were the main beneficiaries of auctioning
off public assets in the Arab World and elsewhere. ART purchased an extensive catalogue of
Egyptian films after the Egyptian Ministry of Culture put them up for sale at a highly discounted
price, reportedly $1200 per film.37 By 2004 two-thirds of the Egyptian film library was under the
control of Saudi capital after Rotana (another Arab media giant) bought thousands of Egyptian
films that had been made since 1935.38 Saleh Kamel also bought a share of the successful
commercial broadcaster, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) in 1996. LBC was the
longest-running commercial channel since it’s founding in 1985 when the Christian-nationalist
militia established it.
In a short space of time, ART managed to put together a package of specialist channels of
pay-TV, and it dominated this sector. Of reportedly 100 pay-TV channels in the region, ART
owned 40. These included 10 sports channels, and Saleh Kamel purchased the rights to the 2002
football World Cup for $86 million. The next world cup in 2006 cost him $186 million. The
desire for premium content and market domination was also the reason for the company’s
involvement in the creation of the Arab Football Champion’s League. ART also purchased the
right to broadcast many other sporting events, including NBA, F1, English and German Premier
League Football, as well as UEFA Champions League. ART’s package also consisted of five music
channels offering a combination of Western and regional music. Film, sport, and music were the
kind of premium content that was supposed to make the operation of rapidly expanding Arab
television channels commercially viable and successful. Yet, as Booz Allen Hamilton reported back
in 2005, while pay-TV had shown strong subscriber growth in the region, this particular sector
in the Arab world was highly fragmented. Pay-TV penetration was reported at only a modest 5%
across the region, which ranged from 3% in Egypt to 29% in UAE. Therefore, even though ART
might have claimed to be the leading pay-TV operator in the region with a market share of 52%
in Saudi Arabia, 56% in UEA, 35% in Kuwait, and 85% in Egypt, the actual number of subscribers
in a region of 190 million in 2005 barely passed 1 million.39 The regional and familial connections
are not irrelevant here. ART in particular was a strong player in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
Saleh Kamel the owner of ART has been keen and adamant that a key role and function of
his company is to offer a different vision and view of Islam to the world. He explained the reason
behind launching Iqra channel as part of his satellite TV package by saying that it aims to cater
to “someone like me [who is] not completely to the left or the right—and there are millions like
me. [I] wanted to present a more tolerant, middle of the road message to the Arab and other
people of the world.”40 With so much controversy over the nature of some of the programs,
including music video channels, he insisted that nothing on ART’s channels would be shown
that he would not want his children to watch.41
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In 2009, Kamel sold his sports channels to Aljazeera Sports and the remaining channels to Orbit.
Prior to that and in 2003, ART five music channels, which were under the control of Alwaleed
bin Talal, were sold to Rotana. Alwaleed bin Talal reduced his share in ART to 5%, and Saleh
Kamel was offered an undisclosed share in Rotana. Rivalry and competition were fierce and yet
the “common good” of capital and the state remains the most prominent and lays the groundwork
for overlaps and collaborations in media industry. The search for power and influence in the case
of Saleh Kamel never included a news channel or even news bulletins on his services.
LBC-Rotana
LBC-Rotana is without a doubt the largest media company in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia’s
Kingdom Holding Company owns it. Kingdom Holding Group is the largest conglomerate in
the region, with a wide range of interests from petroleum, gas, construction, and banking to
agriculture, aviation, luxury goods, and the media; 95% of the Kingdom Holding Company and
90% ownership of LBC-Rotana is in the hands of Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal, a nephew of the
late Saudi King Abdullah, a grandson of Ibn Saud, the first Saudi king, and a grandson of Riad
Al Solh, Lebanon’s first Prime Minister. In 2015 Forbes magazine listed him as the richest Arab
and the 34th richest person in the world, with a net worth of $22.6 billion.42 According to Forbes,
he holds ownership stakes in Twitter, Citigroup, Time Warner, hotel management companies
Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, Movenpick Hotels & Resorts, and Fairmont Raffles Holding;
and hotel real estate, including the swanky Hotel George V in Paris as well as a stake in the Savoy
Hotel in London. He is among the biggest investors in the Middle East and among the largest
foreign investors in the U.S.
The commodity circuits of Kingdom Holding group include Savola, (supermarkets and
hypermarkets); Herfy’s fast food; Licensee of SAKS Inc. (handbags, jewelry, cosmetics including
Dior, Cartier, Prada, Roberto Cavali, and Valentino); and its financial circuits encompass SAMBA;
Citigroup; Industry and Commercial Bank of China, and the Bank of China; Banks in Ghana,
Nigeria, Togo, Senegal; PADICO and APIC; 1% or more of total shares in Ford, Eastman Kodak,
Hewlett Packard, Motorola, Pepsico, Procter and Gamble, Walt Disney, eBay, Amazon.com;
Twitter; News Corporation; and Azizia Commercial Investment Company.43 The Kingdom
Holding Group provides a clearest example of the link between global and regional capitals.
Alwaleed is Citigroup’s largest individual shareholder and the second-largest voting shareholder
in 21st Century Fox. He also holds approximately 7% stake in News Corporation, and in 2015
he increased his share in Twitter to 5.17%. According to Forbes this “equates to a whopping 34.9
million shares worth nearly $1 billion. It also makes him the second-biggest investor in the company
behind co-founder Evan Williams, who owns 6.9%. It puts him ahead of new CEO Dorsey, who
owns 3.2%.”44 In return, News Corporation bought 19% of LBC-Rotana for a reported $175
million, and in June 2015 France’s Sovereign Wealth Fund announced that it had agreed to invest
a minimum of $150 million in the Kingdom Holding Company. They have also agreed on a
separate plan for joint investment of around $400 million. Saudi Arabia has been at the forefront
of Gulf States’ attempt to purchase the most significant and recognizable real estate landmarks in
Paris, London, and elsewhere.
Alwaleed, an alumnus of Menlo College in California and Syracuse University, has also made
generous donations and investments in North American and European universities. In 2008, the
Times Higher Education Supplement reported that the prince had donated £16 million to the
universities of Cambridge and Edinburgh to set up new centers for Islamic Studies.45 Both centers
are named after him. The Islamic Studies Program at Harvard University, the Center for Muslim-
Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, and the Institute for Computational
Biomedicine at Cornell University have also received donations from and are named after
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Alwaleed. On the other hand, he has also donated large sums to the University of Cairo and
American University of Beirut to set up centers for American Studies and Research. Both of these
centers are also named after him.
The Kingdom Holding Group had cemented its reputation at the end of 1990 by paying $207
million for slightly less than 5% of the crisis-ridden and biggest American bank at the time, Citigroup.
In February 1991, he increased his share to 14.9% after spending $509 million for an additional
10% of shares. In 1999, The Economist suggested that Alwaleed’s investments were mysterious and
speculated that the prince could not possibly have such deep pockets and asked whether he is a
front man for other Saudi investors.46 During the 1990s, Kingdom Holding Group’s spending
and investment spree which began with purchase of 30% of ART in 1993, 25% of Euro Disney
SCA in 1994, and 25% of Rotana Audio Visual (the biggest music label in Saudi Arabia) in 1995,
was followed by 50% of a Saudi Telecom company and 3% of Mediaset in Italy. Kingdom Holding
Group also purchased shares in Apple, Sony, News Corporation, AOL, Motorola, and advertising
agency Satchi and Satchi. By 2003, Kingdom Holding Group had taken full control of Rotana
after increasing their stake to 100%. In the same year in a swap deal between the two owners of
ART (Saleh Kamel and Alwaleed bin Talal), the five music channels of ART were also added to
Rotana’s already extensive catalogue. This significant and massive music library provided the ground
for the launch of four specialized music channels by Rotana. As Kraidy has suggested, by the mid-
2000s “Rotana had become a monopolistic giant in music and music video production, its roster
encompassing leading Gulf, Egyptian and Lebanese stars.”47 In 2003, Alwaleed also bought ART’s
49% stake in LBC-Sat for $100 million. LBC, with its entertaining and liberal content, was a
particular hit among younger viewers in the Arab World. This represented a growing influence
of Saudi’s capital in Lebanon.
Kingdom Holding Company also has stake in Lebanese newspapers An Nahar and Ad Diyar.
Another Saudi prince and former deputy minister of defense in Saudi’s government is also a
shareholder of LBC and owner of pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat. The merger between Rotana
and LBC in 2007 consolidated the Saudi’s control over more media in the region and, in particular,
Lebanon. The assumption is that such mergers and a concentration of media ownership in the
region makes commercial sense. According to Kraidy, such development “reflected commercial
calculation in a market in which everyone knows that the Saudi viewer is the target of satellite
channels . . . because he is advertiser’s target (Badi, 2006)”48 There is not, however, much data
to prove such assumption. The field as a whole is not transparent and figures are few and far
between. Even though there is little doubt that Saudi Arabia is the biggest and richest market in
the Gulf, there is no evidence that media conglomerates get a sizable return for their investments.
In fact, as Paul Cochrane, contributing editor to Arab Media & Society, pointed out, Kingdom
Holding Company’s overall assset slumped by 44% in 2008, a net loss of $8.26 billion.49 The
company responded by slashing music CD prices by 70% (from $12 to $4) and sacking hundreds
of staff. This is not unique to Kingdom Holding’s media business. Aljazeera (the best-known media
brand in the region) is also a loss-making operation, with the Qatari government injecting $400
million every year to maintain it.50
The issue of location has been as important for Kingdom Holding Company as it has been for
other media conglomerates in the region. LBC-Rotana has operated from a number of sites, but
mostly from Beirut. However, the company moved most of its operations to Cairo in 2008 to
overcome security concerns. In 2011, Alwaleed moved his headquarters to yet another new free
media zone, Manama Media City. Bahrain incentives included rent-free facilities and $15 million.
However, the fate of Al-Arab news channels raises another layer of complexity and contradiction
at the heart of collaboration and rivalry in the region. What was missing from Alwaleed’s media
business was a news channel that could compete with Aljazeera, MBC’s Al-Arabyia, CNBC Arabyia,
the U.S.-funded Al-Huraa, Iranian channel Al-Alam, Sky News Arabia, France 24 in Arabic, and
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the BBC Arabic service. The plan for a news channel was announced in 2010 initially as part of
LBC-Rotana and later on as independent from Alwaleed’s other media business. The channel
struck a partnership with Bloomberg Television, which was to provide five hours of regional and
global financial and business news. Alwaleed had already relocated much of his operation to Bahrain
due to his close links with the Bahraini royal family, and Manama was chosen as the base for Al-
Arab since Saudi Arabia doesn’t allow the existence of private news channels. The channel was
launched and closed on the same day, February 1, 2015. As Gulf News reported, a news ticker
appeared on screen explaining the abrupt interruption of broadcast in the following way: “The
broadcasting has stopped for technical and administrative reasons and we will resume soon, God
willing.”51 In fact, the stopping of coverage was not due to technical fault but rather because Al-
Arab had decided to conduct an interview with a leading figure of the Al Wefaq Islamic Society
(the main Shia political party in the Sunni-ruled monarchy) over the revocation of the nationality
of 72 people in Bahrain. The Guardian newspaper reported that “Saudi opposition activists
speculated that the decision might have been taken under pressure from Riyadh rather than from
Bahrain, indicating a more hardline media stance under King Salman.”52
Orbit Showtime Network
Adam Hanieh suggests that the internationalization of capital in the region’s media sector has been
further confirmed by the merger of Showtime and Orbit that resulted in the creation of Orbit
Showtime Network (OSN). This merger “is a strong illustration of internationalization in the
[Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)]—a joint Saudi/Kuwaiti company, headquartered in the UAE,
holding a major share of the market in all GCC countries.”53 Kuwait Projects Company (KIPCO)
owns 60.5% and the Saudi investment company, Mawarid Holding, controls 39.5%. Orbit
Showtime Network is registered and based in yet another free zone, which is the Dubai
International Financial Centre (DIFC). With the merger OSN became the biggest pay-TV provider
in the Middle East and North Africa, offering over 100 channels featuring new movies, sports,
Arabic content, and international shows.
By the mid-2000s, Orbit, Showtime, and ART were competing in an uncertain and fragmented
pay-TV market. Orbit’s operations were headquartered in Bahrain and consisted of 32 television
and 20 radio channels offered in different packages (bouquet) in the Middle East, North Africa,
and Europe. Its services were available through cable in the UAE and Qatar. Showtime, a joint
venture between Viacom (21%) and KIPCO (79%), had initially started in London but later relocated
to Dubai Media City. Showtime’s holdings consisted of 33 TV and 10 radio channels and, like
its competitor, it was offering different packages and services in the Middle East and North Africa.
A feature of Showtime was its strong Western content, which was secured through exclusive deal
with Paramount, DreamWorks, Disney, Sony, and Universal Studios. In terms of their share of
the market in the region, both companies were lagging behind ART, except in Kuwait where
the Kuwaiti capital majority owning Showtime’s share of the market was 50%.54 The profile of
both companies again indicates the diversity of circuits of Gulf capital and its close links with the
royal families of the region.
KIPCO is the biggest private company in Kuwait and has diverse interests in banking and
finance, insurance, real estate, manufacturing, education, and media. The portfolio of KIPCO
encompasses over 60 companies operating in 24 countries. In 2015, its assets were estimated at
$31.3 billion. The KIPCO chairman is Sheikh Hamad al-Sabah, son of the Kuwaiti Amir. The
company launched Showtime Arabia in 1996 as a joint venture with Viacom. This joint venture
not only gave KIPCO a license from Viacom to use the Showtime name,55 but also heralded the
entry of a global media player into the region.56
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Orbit began operating in 1994 from Italy by Mawarid Holding and in direct competition with
Saudi-owned ART. The company is owned by a Saudi prince, Khalid bin Abdullah Al Saud.
Like other conglomerates in the region Mawarid has diversified business interests in finance,
construction, real estate, food chains, medical supplies, and telecommunication. Mawarid’s
operation consists of 27 subsidiaries. Mawarid’s interest in media began with an interest in buying
Star TV (based in Hong Kong), but it was Murdoch’s News Corporation that added Star to its
rapidly expanding international portfolio. Nevertheless, Alexander Zilo, one of the founders of
Star TV, was recruited by Mawarid to head his Orbit network.57 Orbit began with an initial
investment of $1 billion and promised to offer a diverse package targeting affluent viewers. One
of the very first acts of Orbit was to sign an agreement with BBC to deliver a news channel in
Arabic. The 10-year agreement, however, came to an abrupt end in less than two years after Saudi
Arabia objections to its coverage. Declaring itself private and being based in Rome didn’t mean
that Orbit could escape its affiliation or loyalty to the Kingdom. Through its link with Star TV,
Orbit also offered a package of nine channels from Star, which included Star Movies, Star Sports,
CNBC, Sky News, and FOX Kids Network. In the same year, 1997, the company also signed
an agreement with Disney that included the Disney channel in Arabic and ESPN Sport.58
In 2005, Mawarid established Integrated Telecom Company and it immediately consolidated
its status as a leading provider of data, satellite, and broadband solutions. Mawarid’s intention for
expansion of its operation was confirmed when Integrated Telecom Company signed a deal of
around U.S.$1.06 billion with the Korean Middle East Engineering Company (KOMEE) to increase
its network coverage by 10,000 square kilometres.59 However, the company was shut down in
May 2013 because of concerns over its financial health and trading violations. The company had
been fined $53 million in September 2012 for violating what Arab Business referred to as “markets
laws and listing rules and failing to inform the Communication and Information Technology
Commission in writing that it could not pay SR2.8bn worth of financial obligations.”60
Concluding Remarks
Media concentration in the Arab World has rapidly surpassed and broken the old state monopolies.
In the process, the Gulf states, and in particular Saudi Arabia, have emerged as the new masters.
Since the 1990s, members of the Saudi royal family and their associates have established or gained
control of MBC, ART, LBC-Rotana, Orbit, and dozens more. The process appears even more
complicated because the details of investment, business deals, revenues, and audience figures are
seldom reported openly.61 As Sakr has pointed out, the leading firms have the advantage of backing
from powerful political forces and enjoy new forms of patronage. “Among the dominant firms
in the Arab television, a high proportion of resource allocation continued to be the sole prerogative
of a small, interconnected group of owners who kept their reasons and trade-offs to themselves.”62
We can conclude by highlighting some of the most significant paradoxes of recent developments.
First, and as other have suggested,63 rapid internationalization of the media sector in the region
has had profound cultural implications. The leading firms, dominated by Saudi Arabia, indeed
have offered packages and programs that are significantly at odds with their owners’ and masters’
norms and views on morality. As I stated in the introduction, the feeling of a collective national
identity in the Arab World is real and historical and not simply a creation of satellite TV. But the
cultural implication of TV programs (of different varieties, including news) has been significant.
The logic of capital has provoked a broader cultural transformation in the region. Many of the
most popular genres, such as reality TV and music, as Tawil-Souri has observed, have also made
their way into religious channels such as Al Resallah (owned by Kingdom Holding) and Iqra (owned
by ART). However, we might also consider how we can understand these explosions now that
the Arab Spring has given way to freezing winter and the region is experiencing unprecedented
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turmoil. In 1998, Jon Alterman suggested that the new Arab media might also pave the way for
a new kind of Arab identity. Comparing this new kind of Arab identity to the heyday of nationalist
movements in the region, Alterman suggested that this “‘new Arabism’ tends to be Islamic-leaning
rather than secular, and it emanates from the Persian Gulf rather than the Levant.”64 The rise of
Islamism (in its current phase) certainly provides ample evidence to support his claim.
Second, and as can be seen from the fate of BBC Arabic services for MBC, the extremely
short life of the Al-Arab channels and controversies over certain programs, the political and so-
called moral sensitivities of the ruling elites impose more than minor limits on the media system.
As such, labeling the media barons of the region as modernizers65 or reformists66 is deeply
problematic. Skovgaard-Peterson is therefore right in highlighting that “however liberal these
moguls consider themselves, they are first and foremost members of the topmost elite in
undemocratic and illiberal countries, and the reformist tenets of their channels are not intended
to change the power relations in them.”67 They have facilitated the entry of global giants such as
Disney and News Corporation and their varied products. Likewise the global giants have been
more than happy to collaborate with the ruling families of the region.
The final point to consider is the role of the state. As the data show, the rapid rise and expansion
of Arab media that has complicated the global media picture is facilitated and maintained with
direct help from Gulf states and in particular Saudi Arabia. This reality inevitably brings to the
fore the relationship between capital and state. Questions about the state and capital, as well as
their possible independent determining effect on historical developments, remain a contentious
issue. In particular, the idea that the state is not subject to immediate or direct control by capital
but rather has a degree of autonomy has generated considerable discussion. The “relative
autonomy” thesis also has been applied in analysis of the Middle East. Hanieh argues that Rentier-
state theory in particular “relies heavily upon a notion of ‘relative autonomy,’ in which the state
is seen as a distinct sphere of the political economy with a high degree of latitude to maneuver
and deploy economic strategies free from the constraints of the capitalist class.”68 A general problem
with relative autonomy is the difficulty of identifying and specifying the levels and limits of
“relative.” But this difficulty is even more acute in the region in which, as Gilber Achcar has
argued, the bourgeoisie is “deriving its economic power from the state, while functioning as private
capitalism.”69 The cases examined in this chapter leave no doubt that the species of capitalism
that are allowed to develop in the region do so under a particular political context.
The difficulty with the thesis of “relative autonomy” of state can be solved if the state is not
seen simply as being outside of social relation and an isolated thing. The state is not external to
capitalism but, in fact, it is the mediator of capitalist class. Yet this manifests itself in different
ways. The form of this “mediation” varies from country to country. It is precisely the social relations
that can help us understand the forms and shifts in mediation. Bob Jessop has argued that “the
social content of politics is related mainly to the economic interests of the contending classes and
class fractions in specific conjunctures and/or periods, in particular social formation, rather than
abstract interests identified at the level of a mode of production”70 In regions such as the Middle
East, particularly in the Gulf region, a simultaneous membership of state institution as well as
capitalist class is not novel but rather common. The companies examined in this chapter are clear
indicators of the close link between the state and capital. Simultaneous high-ranking positions in
the state, the royal family, and the capitalist class are indeed possible and even appear to be the
norm. This reality, rather than making the region appearing as “exceptional,” highlights the
complexity and the specific conjectures that Jessop has in mind. The boundary between private
capital and the state in the Gulf is so blurred that if one wants to insist on “relative autonomy”
it makes sense to talk of relative autonomy of private capital from state, not the other way around.
Gholam Khiabany teaches in the Department of Media and Communications at Goldsmiths,
University of London.
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